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Adoption of robots, in particular, has been connected to reduced employment and wages in local labor markets (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017) . A recent study by the McKinsey Global Institute even suggested that about half of the work activities people perform could be automated with current technology (Manyika et al. 2017 ). While automation is already having significant effects on many parts of the workforce and advances in ML are impressive, we remain far from a world of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) that replaces human work across entire occupations.
To delve deeper, we focused on which work tasks within occupations will be most affected by ML, and which will be relatively unaffected. When considering this question, a key insight must be maintained: An occupation can be viewed as a bundle of tasks, some of which offer better applications for technology than others (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003) . As with other studies of task automation, the impact of ML on employment is a function of SML for specific work activities. We find that ML's potential will affect a different set of tasks than earlier technologies for task automation.
Our research examines the channels by which ML can affect the workforce. We apply Brynjolfsson and Mitchell's (2017) rubric for evaluating the potential for applying ML to 2,069 work activities, 18,156 tasks, and 964 occupations in the O*NET database. From this, we build measures of SML for labor inputs in the U.S. economy. We then discuss measures of the potential for reorganization.
IN THIS BRIEF
1. Machine learning (ML) technologies will grow more pervasive.
2. Jobs are bundles of work tasks. The suitability for machine learning (SML) for work tasks varies greatly.
3. ML will rarely automate entire jobs. More often, it will lead to the reengineering of processes and the reorganization of tasks.
4. Analysis suggests that ML will affect very different parts of the workforce, including many professional jobs, compared with earlier waves of automation.
5. A shift is needed in the debate about the impact of artificial intelligence on work: Away from the focus on full automation of many jobs, and toward the redesign of jobs and processes.
One criterion for task SML is that the set of inputs and the corresponding set of outputs for the task can be measured sufficiently well that a machine can learn the mapping between the two sets.
In the case of ML, we find that: 1. Most occupations in most industries have at least some tasks that are SML. 2. Few occupations have all tasks that are highly SML. 3. Unleashing ML potential will require significant redesign of the task content of jobs, as SML and non-SML tasks within occupations become unbundled and re-bundled.
MACHINE LEARNING AND TASK AUTOMATION
Previous-generation automation has had a significant impact on productivity and the workforce based on explicit rules or manually written computer algorithms. However, applications of automation were limited to areas where knowledge could be codified as a computer program. Because of Polanyi's Paradox-the fact that we humans have "tacit knowledge"; we "know more than we can tell" (Polanyi 1966 )-many tasks that humans know how to do, such as visually inspecting parts, had resisted automation because of our inability to codify this skill in a computer program.
By contrast, most of the recent progress in ML performance has been made by a specific class of algorithms called deep neural networks, or more generally, deep learning systems. 1 With deep learning systems, ML models circumvent Polanyi's Paradox by inferring the mapping function between inputs and outputs automatically and analyzing large amounts of sample data instead of being explicitly programmed. While not always interpretable or explainable, these ML models open a new set of possibilities for automation and complementarities to labor. Software using deep neural nets can be extended to new domains formerly closed to digitization by the high cost or impossibility of writing explicit maps of inputs to outputs and policies.
As a result, the types of tasks affected by ML tomorrow will be quite different from those affected in past waves of automation.
1The AI Index Report at http://cdn.aiindex.org/2017-report.pdf contains a series of benchmarks.
ASSESSING SML
Successful application of ML is contingent on a variety of task characteristics and contextual factors of work activities. While we find it daunting to imagine all the ways a task could be automated-matching wits with the collective ingenuity of all the world's entrepreneurs-the scope of tasks that are SML is much more constrained and definable. Evaluating worker activities with our rubric has the benefit of focusing on what ML can do and avoiding grouping all forms of automation together.
Suboptimal bundling of SML and non-SML tasks in jobs couldalso prevent specialization and block potential productivity gains from ML. For instance, if the cost of ML capital (and SML task wage) were zero, workers would prefer to switch to tasks that ML cannot do. If firms only offer labor contracts that have a preset mixture of SML and non-SML tasks, all of the labor effort put toward SML tasks has an output opportunity cost. In other words, ML could be doing those tasks, and the firm could increase profit if it were to reorganize jobs into new bundles of tasks.
As noted, we used the O*NET content model for 964 occupations in the U.S. economy joined to 18,156 specific tasks at the occupation level, which are further mapped to 2,069 direct work activities (DWAs) shared across occupations. Applying a rubric of 23 questions, each DWA is scored for its SML by seven different people via the crowd-sourcing platform CrowdFlower.
The rubric is applied to each DWA to generate initial SML scores. High values of SML indicate where ML might have the greatest potential to transform a job. Table1 summarizes the SML measures for occupations, tasks, and activities from our analysis. Table 2 presents the occupations with the five highest and five lowest values for SML on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. Massage therapists seem fairly immune to machine learning technology, for instance, while concierges may be concerned. (Interestingly, the occupation "economist" scores close to average, with SML of 3.46) The variance of occupationlevel SML is considerably lower than task-level SML.
Scale: 5 = maximum SML, 1 = minimum SML Our research reveals a high level of variability for the potential of ML within jobs (within-occupation standard deviation of task SML scores is 0.596). Jobs with higher within-occupation standard deviation of SML have higher potential for reorganization.
There are a number of important conceptual caveats to this application of the SML rubric. First, the rubric focuses on technical feasibility. It is silent on the economic, organizational, legal, cultural, and societal factors that can have an important influence on ML adoption. Matching the evolving state-of-the-art in ML in the future will require updating the rubric accordingly. 2
IMPLLICATIONS OF SML FOR THE WORKPLACE
It's likely that ML will not have the same effects as the last waves of automation, which led to increased inequality and wage polarization as routine cognitive tasks were automated (Autor and Dorn 2013) . The correlation coefficients of SML with wage percentile and wage bill percentiles, for instance, are very low: −0.14 and 0.10, respectively. ML is a very different technology
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Furthermore, we find indicators that the next wave of automation and reengineering may affect a different part of the labor force than the last one: The correlation coefficients with wage and total wage bill percentiles and within-occupation standard deviation of SML are 0.17 and 0.002. However, it's important to note that the ex ante potential of ML may differ from its ultimate implementation, as other factors come to bear. We might see, for example, largescale ML platform companies contracted to automate aspects of various jobs. The wage and employment effects of these contracts are ambiguous given possible channels of demand elasticity, complementary task efforts, and substitutes.
Additionally, although SML correlation with wage and total wage expenditure percentiles is low, the actual implementation of ML technologies by managers and integrators may not follow the SML rankings. If technological change is directed, the implementation of ML by managers and entrepreneurs will be focused on the high wage bill tasks with higher SML.
If ML does substitute outright for some occupational tasks, rebundling residual tasks in new jobs may transfer risk from the firm to its workers. This will affect job design, compensation, and the organization of work. For instance, workers may need to be compensated for taking on bundles of tasks with harderto-measure average performance when machines handle measurable tasks. Thus, over time, worker performance would become harder to evaluate since the most measurable tasks tend to be the most SML. Improvements in technologies have historically been the key driver of increased industrial productivity. At the same time, they have also disrupted employment and the wage structure systematically. Our analysis suggests that in this era of technological progress, ML will affect very different parts of the workforce than earlier technology waves. Furthermore, tasks within jobs typically show considerable variability in SML, while few (if any) jobs can be fully automated using ML.
Machine learning technology can and will transform many jobs in the economy, but automation of entire jobs will be less significant than the reengineering of processes and the reorganization of tasks. The focus of researchers, as well as managers and entrepreneurs, should, therefore, be not just on automation, but on job redesign. 
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